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INTRODUCTION: IS A FEDERAL STANDARD OF LIABILITY
FOR INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS NECESSARY?
Few things in life are more actively sought, or treasured, in today's
society than immunity from prosecution or liability. Whether one is a
corporate director, a foreign diplomat, or a testifying potential felon-
the rationale for granting the privilege is usually the same: the freedom
from liability encourages a person to act in a manner in which she would
not without the privilege. The institution grants the privilege because of
its value judgment that the behavior the privilege is thought to encourage
is more valuable than the potential costs of granting the privilege. These
judgments are made everyday by legislators, courts, agencies, and other
powerful bodies. Congress made such a decision in 1996 by enacting the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"),' which strongly lim-
ited the potential liability of internet service providers ("ISPs") for
information content created by third parties that can be accessed via the
Internet from their servers.
In a series of decisions since the enactment of the CDA, the federal
courts have interpreted the Act to bar virtually all liability of ISPs for
* Associate, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, and Handler, LLP., J.D., University of
Michigan Law School, 2000, Lawrence University, 1991. The author would like to thank
Professor Julie Cohen for her comments and assistance in the drafting of this note for her
Cyberspace and the Law seminar.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. II 1996).
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. H 1996).
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providing access to defamatory information created by third parties.3 The
vast majority of ISPs are in the business of selling access to third parties
and publish virtually no information content of their own, and those
third parties are likely to have meager funds of their own to satisfy a
defamation judgment; therefore, the effect of the CDA has been to trans-
form the Internet into an almost liability-free zone for libelous content.
As traditional print media moves more and more toward the Internet,
such a regime can eventually do considerable harm not only to those
whose reputations and livelihood are endangered by libelous statements,
but also to the potential of the Internet as a reliable, easily accessible,
and inexpensive means of communication for the reporters of tomorrow
as well as for existing print and broadcast media. The development of a
more inexpensive and accessible print media has been one of the Inter-
net's greatest innovations, and one for which the proliferation of ISPs is
largely responsible.
Though the rapid development of the Internet has created a fertile
ground for legal innovation, more often than not legislators and courts
have sought to address this relatively new medium by attempting to
squeeze it into precedents and paradigms better suited to older forms of
communication, technology, and media.4 Part I of this article looks back
at the courts' initial efforts at addressing defamation via the Internet.
From the start the courts attempted to fit the role of the ISP into the
common law's categorizing of print media as either "publishers" or
"distributors" of information. One court's misstep in overextending the
liability of one ISP to that of a publisher led Congress to sweep ISP li-
ability into the CDA in an attempt to give ISPs more tools to regulate
content they consider offensive.5 Part I then takes a look at the most
recent major Internet defamation case, Blumenthal v. Drudge, and how it
cemented the current regime, which interprets Congress's prohibition of
ISP liability for "publishers" as a prohibition against virtually all liabil-
ity and not a narrowing of ISP liability to that of a "distributor.,
6
The potential ramifications for allowing ISPs to be liable as
"distributors" of third party defamatory content are addressed in Part III.
In particular, the section focuses on whether a notice-based liability re-
gime could function on the Internet without either compromising the
3. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
4. See, e.g., American Libraries Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Not surprisingly, much of the legal analysis of Internet-related issues has focused on
seeking a familiar analogy for the unfamiliar.")
5. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995).
6. Drudge, 992 F. Supp at 51.
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medium's main advantages or chilling free speech. Part IV takes into
account these same concerns while arguing for a narrow application of
"publisher" liability to those few ISPs that fulfill a content-providing
role akin to that of a publisher of a newspaper or magazine. By examin-
ing the Drudge case directly, this comment demonstrates how traditional
safeguards in defamation law like the "actual malice" standard for public
figures will severely limit the chances of these ISPs to fall victim to un-
warranted liability, and that a federal exemption from "publisher"
liability for ISPs was never really necessary.
Defamation law is one field where Congress could effectively legis-
late a federal standard based on prior precedents with minor tweaking
without taking the sledgehammer tactic of providing blanket immunity
to those who provide access to the defamers of tomorrow. A federal
standard is necessary due to the unique jurisdictional concerns of the
Internet that are examined in Part V. Congress should reform the CDA
to create a more even playing field between Internet media providers and
broadcast and print media providers so that the former (just as much as
the latter) may be found liable as "distributors" when they fall to remove
defamatory content of which they are aware. In addition, if an ISP com-
missions and edits information content in a manner analogous to
newspaper or book publishers, it should be held to the stricter
"publisher" standard of fault as well.
I. STATE OF THE CURRENT REGIME: THE ENACTMENT
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE
WEAKENING OF THE PUBLISHER/DISTRIBUTOR DISTINCTION
The portion of the "protection for 'good samaritan' blocking and
screening of offensive material" 7 provision of the CDA at issue in the
Internet defamation cases states simply that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider."'
Congress enacted this amendment specifically to counteract the decision
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.9 that held an ISP liable
as a "publisher" for defamatory information content created by a third
party.'0 Congress feared this decision would discourage ISPs from taking
active steps to monitor and remove offensive content from public view."
7. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. II 1996).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. I 1996).
9. 23 Media L. Rep. at 1794.
10. See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 435 (1996)
11. See 142 CONG. REc. S8345.
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In Stratton Oakmont the term "publisher" was used to differentiate enti-
ties like newspapers and magazines that exercise editorial control and
judgment from "distributors" of information like bookstores that are
only held liable if "they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory
statement at issue."12 Considering that the provision was enacted to
overturn that case, one would think that the courts would find the
meaning of the word "publisher" within the context of that distinction.
The Fourth Circuit, however, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., chose to
interpret it as applying in a general sense to all "publication" of infor-
mation. 3 Such an interpretation, in the words of the Zeran court, creates
a "federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service pro-
viders liable for information originating with a third party user of the
service."' 4 This immunity only flows from the CDA, however, if one
interprets "publisher" in this general sense and not in the context of the
publisher/distributor fault distinction used in the very case that Congress
sought to address.
Stratton Oakmont involved a claim that the ISP Prodigy Services
was liable as a publisher for an allegedly defamatory statement made by
an anonymous user on Prodigy's "Money Talk" computer bulletin board
about the plaintiff-a securities investment banking firm named Stratton
Oakmont, Inc."5 The Stratton Oakmont court relied on caselaw that holds
"distributors" and "publishers" of defamatory matter to different stan-
dards of fault.16 While a publisher (for example, a newspaper, TV
network, or magazine) is subject to liability as if it had published the
third party defamatory material itself, a distributor (for example, a book-
store or a newsstand) can be liable only if it knew or had reason to know
of the defamatory material. 7 The rationale for treating distributors dif-
ferently is that they are more like "passive conduit[s] and will not be
found liable in the absence of fault."'8
In an earlier case involving another large ISP (CompuServe) and a
similar defamation claim regarding a bulletin board posting, Cubby Inc.
v. CompuServe Inc.,' 9 the court held that, due to the ISPs lack of editorial
control over the publication of articles on the bulletin board, it was the
functional equivalent of a news vendor and thus could only be held li-
12. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1796.
13. 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
14. Id.
15. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1795.
16. Id. at 1796.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 578, 581 (1976).
18. Stratton Oaknont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1796.
19. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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able under a distributor's standard.20 The Stratton Oakmont court distin-
guished Prodigy's conduct from CompuServe's by finding that the
former maintained enough editorial control over the articles posted on
the "Money Talks" bulletin board to merit being held to a publisher's
standard of fault.2' Prodigy had promised the public that it controlled the
content on its computer bulletin boards by deleting language it deemed
to be offensive, and had done so through the use of automatic software
and by promulgating guidelines that directed the Board managers (called
"Board Leaders") to remove offensive language and content2 Through
its own conduct, policies, and technology, Prodigy had thus "altered the
scenario and mandated the finding that it is a publisher."
'z
In the wake of Stratton Oakmont it seemed clear that in defamation
actions involving online speech the courts would hold service providers
who took a largely "hands-off' approach to be generally free from li-
ability as "distributors," while ISPs that monitored and edited content
would be held to the stricter "publisher" standard. The court's holding
seemed to be at least partly motivated by its own preference for the for-
mer approach on policy grounds. For example, it stated that "Prodigy's
current system ... may have a chilling effect on freedom of communi-
cation in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly
what Prodigy wants, but for the legal liability that attaches to such cen-
sorship. 24 The court's concern about this "chilling effect" is in keeping
with the policy rationale behind modem defamation law that attempts to
balance society's interest in providing "breathing space" for robust pub-
lic debate against the interest of the individual in protecting himself from
unfair reputational harm.2'
The CDA is not suited to address those competing interests because
it was not designed with them in mind. In the "Policy" section of the
Act, Congress states specifically that it intends to "remove disincentives
for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technolo-
gies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material ... ,2 Thus, the main con-
cem of Congress in enacting the Communications Decency Act was not
to absolve ISPs of liability, but to prevent the Internet from becoming a
"red light district" and to "extend the standards of decency which have
20. Id. at 140.




25. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1964).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (Supp. I 1996).
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protected users to new telecommunications districts.""' The crux of the
Act was the provisions prohibiting "the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.
' 'r
Not only would those who actively transmitted or knowingly made
available "indecent" materials to minors have been civilly or criminally
liable under the Act, but so would Internet information content providers
(in other words, ISPs) who "knowingly [permitted] any telecommunica-
tions facility under [their] control to be used for an activity prohibited
[by the Act] with the intent that it be used for such activity ... "2 Be-
cause one could knowingly permit such actions by doing nothing to
monitor them, Congress was clearly trying to encourage information
content providers to self-regulate the activities and speech of people who
stored information on their servers. To that end Congress enacted the
Good Samaritan provisions in the CDA .
In discussing the purpose beyond the "publisher" clause of § 230(c)
Congress said nothing about the potential liability of information content
providers for libel. What it did state was that the "Good Samaritan"
protections from civil liability were intended to aid those ISPs who took
"actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable on-
line material" and to "overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions [that] have treated such [internet service] provid-
ers and users as publishers or as speakers of content that is not their own
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.",31 Thus,
one can see Congress's clear intent was to protect and encourage the
actions of ISPs that take active steps to monitor and remove objection-
able content, not to protect them from liability when they knowingly
choose not to remove objectionable content. Stratton Oakmont uses the
term "publisher" in no other context than to distinguish those who have
control over editorial content from "distributors" who have no such
control; and Congress specifically sought to overturn that decision.
Though Congress did not state so explicitly in the legislative history, it
seems implicit that Congress meant to preserve the distinction and retain
the less strict "distributor" liability for known content. To find otherwise
would appear at cross-purposes with Congress's intention to encourage
active ISP monitoring and enhance user control in order to "empower
parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropri-
27. 141 CONG. REc. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
28. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (summarizing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp.
I1 1997) and overturning much of the CDA, except, among others, the "Good Samaritan"
provisions).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(2) (Supp. m 1997).
30. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. II 1996).
31. S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 435 (1996).
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ate online material;" and to "ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.
3 2
Even though Congress specifically pointed to its desire to overrule
Prodigy in the legislative history, the first major case to apply the provi-
sion in a defamation action inferred a definition of the term "publisher"
that was broader than the one traditionally employed in defamation law
to distinguish "publishers" from "distributors."33 In Zeran v. America
Online, the plaintiff Zeran brought a negligence action against America
Online alleging that the ISP had unreasonably delayed the removal of
defamatory statements posted by an unidentified third party, refused to
post any retractions, and failed to screen its content for subsequent
postings regarding Zeran.34 Zeran clearly had suffered harm to his repu-
tation-the anonymous poster had sent out repeated phony messages
advertising T-shirts ridiculing the Oklahoma city bombing and directing
those "interested" to contact a phone number that was in fact Zeran's
home number.35 Since Zeran ran his business out of his home, the pre-
dictable angry calls and death threats that resulted from the messages
caused damage to his livelihood as well. 3' The actions of the poster
clearly would seem to fit the requirements of the tort of defamation:
publication of defamatory communications that injure the plaintiff's
reputation by diminishing the esteem in which the plaintiff is held, and
exciting derogatory feelings against him.37 It is generally sufficient that
the communication "would tend to prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of a
substantial and respectable minority. '
In light of the CDA provisions eliminating the potential for ISPs to
be found liable as "publishers" of third party conduct, Zeran sought to
hold AOL liable for negligence as a distributor of the material. 39 The
court circumvented the publisher/distributor dichotomy, however, by
stating that when Congress was speaking of "publishers," it meant to
include both publishers and distributors.0 Thus, it held that Congress
was referring to the use of the term "publication" in defamation law as it
is used generally to describe the "communication intentionally or by a
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)-(5) (Supp. II 1996).
33. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 329.
36. Id.
37. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111
(5th ed. 1984).
38. Id. at 774 (summarizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977)).
39. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
40. Id. at 332.
1999-2000]
254 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 6:247
negligent act to one other than the person defamed."' Though the court
correctly noted that Stratton Oakmont and Cubby "do not ... suggest
that distributors are not also a type of publisher for purposes of defama-
tion law,, 42 this interpretation fails to take into account Congress's
specific overruling of Stratton-a case that only addressed media which
belong to the "publisher" subset, and not to all published material.43
IX. BLUMENTHAL v. DRUDGE: Is ISP IMMUNITY A WORKABLE
STANDARD FOR INTERNET PUBLISHING?
Since Zeran dealt with a largely unregulated bulletin board, there
was no need for the court to take into consideration the dual nature of
America Online as both an ISP and a content provider. America Online
(like Prodigy and CompuServe), however, is not a conventional ISP that
merely provides the consumer access to the Internet. It also publishes its
own and third party content in an area that is only open to its own sub-
scribers. 44 This "user-only" content area has been a key factor in AOL's
success as it enables it to attract many neophytes and less computer-
literate World Wide Web ("WWW") users to its service.
In 1997, AOL entered into a written license agreement with Matt
Drudge, the proprietor of an electronic publication on the World Wide
Web entitled the Drudge Report.4 5 The site was, and still is, available for
free to all with access to the WWW and consists of both links to other
news sources as well as Drudge's own personal news report.46 In return
for permission to post content from Drudge in its subscriber-only area,
AOL agreed to pay Drudge a monthly royalty fee of $3,000.'7 Under the
agreement AOL also reserved the rights to remove content from the site
that it deemed to "violate AOL's then standard terms of service,"' 8 and
to "require reasonable changes to ... content, to the extent such content
will, in AOL's good faith judgment, adversely affect operations of the
AOL network.,
49
Thus, one can see that AOL was in fact publishing third party con-
tent and reserving the right to edit that content. AOL also issued a press
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1976).
42. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
43. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1796
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
44. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29.




49. Id. at 51.
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release in which it touted the arrival of The Drudge Report and stated
that their agreement will make his reports "instantly accessible to [AOL]
members who crave instant gossip and news breaks."5" The court re-
ferred to these facts in expressing its frustration that, due to the CDA, it
could not find the provider liable as a publisher of content despite the
fact that it is "not a passive conduit like the telephone company" and
"has the fight[sic] to exercise editorial control over those with whom it
contracts and whose words it disseminates."'" In light of Zeran and the
CDA, the Court felt it was bound by the CDA to defer to Congress's
supposed intent to provide immunity from tort liability for third party
content to ISPs as an incentive for the providers "to self-police the Inter-
net for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-
policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted. 52
Though the court interpreted CDA phrases like "offensive mate-
rial"53 and "otherwise objectionable 4 material to cover defamatory
material, it is quite likely that Congress did not intend to give such a
broad scope to these terms. In the Senate Conference Report for the bill
the "good samaritan" provisions are justified as a means to protect ISPs
who take steps to provide parents with the ability "to determine the con-
tent of communications their children receive through interactive
computer services."5 5 How many parents are seriously trying to prevent
their children from gaining access to defamatory content, and how
would they know it was defamatory in the first place? Defamatory con-
tent is only offensive to the person who suffers injury from harm to her
reputation, and a relatively limited number of family, friends, and other
supporters. It is not by its nature something parents would necessarily
feel the need to restrict, or content that would be offensive on its face. In
addition, because of the vague and overly broad definitions of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" material, the Supreme Court over-
ruled most of the CDA in Reno v. ACLU. " Thus, to rule that Congress
intended the CDA to address defamation liability requires resorting to a
definition of offensive material that the Court found to place "an unac-
ceptably heavy burden on protected speech."57
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id at 52.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. S. CONF. RP. No. 104-230, at 435 (1996).
56. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881-82 (1997).
57. Id. at 882.
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The great irony of the granting of enhanced protection to "good sa-
maritan"58 information content providers is that it has survived the
overturning of the restrictive provisions of the CDA that the provisions
were designed to counterbalance. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court
overturned the indecency provisions of the Act on First Amendment
grounds stating that they were impermissible content-based restrictions
on speech. 9 The Court found it crucial that the regulation in question
was "more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to en-
courage it" and that society's interest in encouraging that freedom
outweighed "any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." 6 In
light of this decision and the subsequent expansion of ISP immunity
from liability in Zeran and Drudge, it appears that we have encountered
a regime where, in the words of the Drudge court, ISPs may take
"advantage of all the benefits conferred by Congress in the Communica-
tions Decency Act, and then some, without accepting any of the burdens
that Congress intended."6' The question then becomes simply: is this a
good thing? If it is not, we will need to find a compromise position that
will satisfy the balancing test at the heart of modem defamation law-
how to "reconcile the interest in reputation with the interest in freedom
of speech. 62 In doing so we will have to keep in mind how this ancient
tort can exist in the rapidly changing worlds within Cyberspace, while
recognizing that the Internet is a field of communications that the Su-
preme Court has firmly declared to be entitled to the highest level of
First Amendment protection.6
I. "DISTRIBUTOR" LIABILITY FOR INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS:
How IT CAN WORK AND WHEN IT SHOULD APPLY
The source of the confusion over the liability of ISPs as publishers is
the Stratton Oakmont decision that clumsily applied a fault standard best
suited for newspapers and book publishers upon Prodigy, merely be-
cause Prodigy attempted to provide a small measure of order and control
over the content of its electronic bulletin boards. The amount of control
Prodigy wielded is crucial to determine whether it belongs to the
"publisher" subset. Such entities are held to "increased liability" because
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp II 1996) (Immunity provision of CDA is entitled
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material").
59. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
60. Id.
61. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1998).
62. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1066 (5th ed. 1990).
63. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
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they are not "passive receptacle[s] or conduit[s]" as they exercise
"editorial control and judgment" over the content they publish. 4 If we
are to view an ISP as an entity that merely provides a means through
which users can transmit written messages to each other then it should
not be liable for "the defamatory character of [a] message unless [it]
knows or has reason to know that the message is libelous."65 In order to
see why Prodigy's role in providing a public forum for the posting of
material on its bulletin boards best fits the "distributor" subset, it is first
necessary to take a more general look at society's interest in preserving
the tort of defamation and the rationale for maintaining a pub-
lisher/distributor distinction within it.
Defamation is said to be a relational interest as it involves the
"opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of
the plaintiff."6 While a direct insult might sustain a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, it will not support a defamation claim if
that communication is not conveyed to a third party.67 The derogatory
words must "diminish the esteem, respect, good-will, or confidence in
which the plaintiff is held, or ... excite adversary, derogatory or un-
pleasant opinions against him."' It is not enough that the plaintiff
personally feels the derogatory words have diminished his standing in
the community, they must be the kind of words that would either be de-
famatory in virtually any case (for example, "an anarchist.., eunuch...
immoral ... coward ... drunkard"),69 or given the current circumstances
and activities of the defamed (for example, saying that an incumbent of a
public office requiring citizenship is not a citizen, or a kosher meat
dealer is accused of selling bacon). 0 In addition, it is not necessary that
anyone believe the allegation to be true since the fact that thE words
have circulated at all must be to some extent injurious to the plaintiff.7
Only a defamatory meaning must be conveyed;72 however, it is crucial
that the actual statement be false, as well as defamatory.73
64. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1796
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. f (1976).
66. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAWv OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 111, at 771 (citing
Green, Rational Interests, 31 U. ILL.L.REv. 35 (1936)).
67. Id.
68. Id. § I 11, at 773 (citing SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS (8th ed., 1934)).
69. Id. § 1I1, at 775.
70. Id. § 111, at 776.
71. Id.§ 11l, at780.
72. Id.
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976).
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Publication is integral to defamation liability.74 It is at this point that
the publisher/distributor distinction becomes crucial to the tort for both
practical and policy reasons. A publisher, like a newspaper or publishing
house, is held to the higher standard because it has "the opportunity to
know the content of the material being published and should therefore be
subject to the same liability rules as are the author and originator of the
written material. 75 For this reason it is subject to liability without proof
of its actual knowledge of the content's possible defamatory nature prior
to its publication, because it is deemed to have been negligent in failing
to ascertain its falsity or defamatory character. 6
Mere distributors, on the other hand, are only liable for defamation
if they know or have reason to know of the defamatory article.77 Because
society values freedom of expression and wide public access to news
and literature, we do not wish to discourage vendors from stocking mate-
rials for fear of liability. Therefore, if there are no facts or circumstances
evident to the disseminator that would indicate to a reasonable person,
upon inspection, that a particular book, magazine, or newspaper contains
defamatory content the distributor will not be found liable for defama-
tion .7  A distributor is not required to examine the material it
disseminates and, absent special circumstances that would warn it in ad-
vance that the content is defamatory, it "is under no duty to ascertain its
innocent or defamatory character."79
Though there is a place for some publisher liability for ISPs over the
Internet, it should only be in cases closer to Drudge where the ISP takes
on a publisher's role. The Stratton Oakmont court should not have asso-
ciated the moderation of newsgroups with that role." The moderators of
those forums did not solicit articles or pay the participants as a true edi-
tor would have done." They simply organized the postings and regulated
content in the same way that the moderator of a town hall meeting would
have2n Because such a moderator would not be held liable for defama-
tion unless she knew in advance that she was facilitating defamatory
statements, neither should Prodigy have been found liable. Though the
Board Leaders had the ability to monitor incoming transmissions and to
74. L
75. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 113 at 810.
76. Id.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d (1976).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1798-99
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
81. Id. at 1797.
82. Id.
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delete offensive content, that does not make them an editorial staff.
Bookstores and libraries make similar decisions in judging what material
to make available and are allowed to take into account its potentially
offensive nature without incurring the status of "publishers" for defama-
tion liability. Though bookstores might not use software to screen
offensive language, ISPs must deal with the dilemma of handling thou-
sands of mostly anonymous postings in a fair and efficient manner,
while at the same time making its boards appealing to those who want to
exchange on-topic information without having to wade through numer-
ous infantile postings full of profanity.
ISPs serve an important role in providing such outlets for the public
to exchange opinions and information. If an ISP wishes to limit all or
some of its boards to notes which are not in "bad taste or grossly repug-
nant to community standards"83 and are conducive to a "harmonious
online community," '' it should be able to do so without incurring the
liability of a traditional publisher. If an individual feels that one board's
content restrictions are too strict he can always move to a board that is
not as restrictive or to one of the thousands of public newsgroups that do
not censor content." Unlike the assertions made in a newspaper or
magazine, which have an extra veneer of truth because the public knows
the articles are approved and commissioned by editors, the public likely
holds no similar illusions about the postings in a public forum. The
guidelines for the Prodigy "Money Talks" board specifically stated that
Prodigy was "committed to open debate and discussion."86 No assertions
were made about the reliability of the postings. The control exercised
was merely used to sustain the harmonious nature of the board.
87
If an ISP is liable "only" under the distributor standard it still must
deal with the problem of how to react once it has been put on notice that
an assertion by a third party broadcast from one of its servers is possibly
defamatory. If the ISP were simply to remove every bulletin board,
newsgroup, or web site posting once one person complained, it could
create a chilling effect on Internet speech. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that unjustified fears of liability for libel can produce a chilling
effect on speech that is antithetical to the First Amendment.88 In addition,
the Zeran court partially justified its decision by finding that liability on
notice has a "chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech."' 9
83. Id at 1796.
84. Id.
85. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
86. See Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1796.
87. Id.
88. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,777 (1986).
89. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
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When private citizens have the power to abridge free speech in a
way that the government does not it creates a power that has been re-
ferred to as the "heckler's veto."90 The term was coined to describe
instances where "the state suppresses the free protest of unpopular
groups because their protest causes observers to want to do them
harm." 9' It has also been used to describe any occasion where a speaker
is "heckled down" by an audience member.2 Thus, it may seem easier to
allow the ISP to provide a forum for unregulated speech without conse-
quences. However, the conflict between the right of the individual to
speak and the right of the individual to preserve his good name has al-
ways required a difficult and often complex balancing of these
competing interests. Up to this point, however, no other media has been
able to exempt itself from liability for this centuries-old tort.93 If there is
to be a way around the "heckler's veto," however, we first must confront
one of the Internet's primary features: anonymity.
If a person feels she has been defamed through an assertion made on
the Internet, one great stumbling block she might face is the ease with
which the medium facilitates anonymity. For example, the plaintiff in
Zeran v. America Online was left without recourse once the court held
AOL to be immune from liability as a distributor of third party informa-
tion content because the messages had been posted by an anonymous
person whose identity was never able to be traced.94 Since Zeran was not
an AOL subscriber he had no access to AOL's content areas, while those
who did subscribe had the opportunity to damage him by defaming his
reputation at will in a "libel-free" zone in which the authors are virtually
free from liability due to anonymity and the ISP is free due to its immu-
nity from being considered liable as a distributor or a publisher.
Anonymity has been both one of the most praised and vilified fea-
tures of the Internet. While AOL and other ISPs with subscriber-only
chat rooms and bulletin boards allow users anonymity through the use of
user names, anyone can take advantage of an even harder to trace
method that disguises the identity of her messages-anonymous remail-
ers. Such services are widely available to anyone who has access to the
World Wide Web.95 Anonymous remailers work by sending a message
along a chain of remailing programs that use cryptography to continually
90. Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech from Private Abridgement: Introducing the Tort
of Supression, 25 Sw. U.L. Rav. 223,253-54 (1996).
91. Il at 224 n.7 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
140 (1965)).
92. Id.
93. See LAWRENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 (1978).
94. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
95. See, e.g., MailAnon, (last modified Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.mailanon.com>.
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forward the communication in ways that disguise the identity of the
original sender.96 These remailers act as a cryptographic equivalent of
the CDA "Good Samaritan" provisions for private figures by allowing
"users to avoid being held responsible for the content of the messages
they send."97 Ironically, the remailers also disguise the user's Internet
service provider."
This anonymity can be one of Cyberspace's greatest virtues by al-
lowing people the freedom to post in newsgroups and bulletin boards
without fear of being harassed or unfairly criticized for their views. One
federal court has noted that proponents of anonymity feel that it protects
them "on a regular basis for the purpose of communicating about sensi-
tive topics without subjecting themselves to ostracism or
embarrassment."" However, anonymity can also protect those who wish
to damage reputations and frustrate efforts by an ISP to determine
whether a complained-about-posting should be removed. If the poster is
anonymous the "heckler's veto" becomes even more powerful since the
free speech concerns of an unknown person are much more likely to be
usurped by the claims of an identifiable potential litigant.
For those who wish to continue the current regime of non-publisher
status for ISPs, a state or federal law restricting the use of anonymous
speech might seem a more viable solution. After all, it would target the
creators of the speech instead of those who merely provide access to it.
However, the Supreme Court has already shown that it will subject con-
tent-based restrictions on free speech over the Internet to its strictest
scrutiny.' ° In addition, a federal court has already struck down a Georgia
law that attempted to impose criminal liability on those who falsify their
identity over the Internet.' °' The court specifically cited the statute's lack
of a requirement of an intent to deceive as evidence that the statute was
not narrowly tailored enough to present a compelling state interest to
restrict the content of speech.'0 Since such an intent would be extremely
difficult to prove anyway, a state or federal statute banning anonymous
speech would seem to have little chance of succeeding as a deterrent to
96. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, BOR-
DERS IN CYBERSPACE, INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE 129, 134-35
(Brian Kahin & Charles Neeson, eds., 1997).
97. Id. at 140.
98. See Alex Lash, Courts Block State Speech Laws, CNet.com, (last modified June 20,
1997) <http:llnews.cnet.com/news/O-10005-200-319931.html?tag=st.ne.1002>.
99. ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp 1228, 1230 (N.D.Ga. 1997).
100. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (striking down provisions of Com-
munications Decency Act).
101. See Miller, 977 F. Supp at 1230.
102. Id. at 1236-37.
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defamation. In addition, ISPs would act as true "distributors" in this
context, and should only be found liable if they had notice and were
given a reasonable amount of time to remove the anonymous defamatory
posting.
Another potential method to lessen the "chilling effect" of notice-
based liability would be for Congress to adopt a notification process for
defamation similar to the one used for potential copyright violations in
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.'03 Under the Act a written notifica-
tion of claimed copyright infringement must be sent to an agent
designated by the ISP and must include a name to contact, specific iden-
tification of the copyrighted work, the address on the Web where the
material is located, a good faith statement that the material is copy-
righted and that the use of it by the party in question has not been
authorized, and a statement that the information is accurate and that the
complaining party (under penalty of perjury) is authorized to act on be-
half of the owner of the right that has been allegedly infringed.' 4 If the
communication does not specifically comply with these requirements
then it cannot be used in considering whether the service provider has
been given "actual notice or is aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent."'0 5 If the notice does comply with
the Act then the ISP must respond expeditiously to remove or disable
access to the material or risk liability.' 6
Such a procedure could work effectively in the context of distributor
liability for defamatory statements as well. A set procedure would re-
move some of the uncertainties about liability and lessen the chilling
effect of the "heckler's veto." Each complainer could be required to
swear (under penalty of perjury) that she has made her accusation of li-
bel in good faith, and to make a detailed factual accounting of her basis
for claiming that the assertion is false and injurious to her reputation. If
the accusation did not provide the ISP with the basis to determine if the
statement was defamatory, then the ISP could be deemed to have not
received sufficient notice for notice-based liability.
In a factual scenario like that in Zeran v. America Online, the proc-
ess would be simple. Once Zeran became aware of the posting that
claimed to offer for sale T-shirts mocking the Oklahoma City bombing
and featuring his phone number, he could send a written communication
to the ISP's designated agent swearing that he offered no such product.
103. See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV
1998).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi) (Supp. IV 1998).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
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He could also detail the numerous crank calls he had received and the
damage it had done to his business. Armed with this notice the ISP could
feel justified in removing the posting, especially considering that the
poster was untraceable. A requirement of providing detailed information
concerning both why the assertion is false and the specific damage it had
caused would likely discourage many of those who might wish to exer-
cise a "heckler's veto" for ulterior motives. It also provides the
individual ISP with an industry-wide standard such that it does not have
to fear that it will lose business to other ISPs that exercise no control
whatsoever. Users will likely have greater respect for a process that only
requires that ISPs remove posts upon receiving detailed notice than one
that works according to the dictates of the "heckler's veto."
In addition, the non-cyberspace related case of Tacket v. General
Motors Corp.'07 shows a way that ISPs could survive a notice-based re-
gime of liability just like all other distributors, even without the aid of a
Federal mandated notice process. That case involved an employee's
claim that he had been defamed and that his injuries had been aggravated
because his employer had intentionally and unreasonably failed to re-
move a sign that had been posted in the plant where he worked. The
employee claimed that the sign disparaged his reputation by accusing
him of being a thief.' The sign was allowed to stand for six or seven
months before it was finally painted over by plant employees. The
court held that since "a reasonable person could conclude that Delco
'intentionally and unreasonably fail[ed] to remove' the sign" it had
therefore published its contents."0 In examining a series of cases in-
volving the question of whether the gap between removal and
notification was significant enough to constitute negligence, the court
proposed a simple cost-benefit test: if "the costs of vigilance are small
... and the benefits potentially large" then negligence can be inferred."'
Such a test could be applied to Cyberspace if courts took into account
the amount of time it took a reasonable ISP to investigate a defamation
complaint and remove it. Relevant factors could include the size of the
ISP, the nature of the posting, the potential harm, the location of the
posting, and the popularity of the site. Due consideration of these factors
could provide a workable standard that both recognizes the unique at-
tributes of this relatively new medium, and provides a remedy to those
107. 836 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. Il at 1047.
109. Id
110. Id. (Delco is a GM subsidiary).
111. Id.
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who reputations are defamed. Otherwise one could find oneself in a cy-
ber-equivalent of the plant in the Tacket case.
None of these measures is perfect, of course. It is much easier for
ISPs to judge whether a copyrighted work has been violated since the
distribution of an album track or software without permission is much
more obvious on its face than whether a factual assertion is defamatory.
It is certainly true that ISPs post thousands of user messages a day, and
the decision-making process as to whether they should remove a posting
upon notice would not be an easy one. However, these concerns beg the
question of whether we should have liability for third party content for
all members of the distributor subset, not just ISPs. While it is true that
ISPs have no special expertise to apply in judging whether assertions are
false, neither do news dealers and book stores.'12 Beyond merely point-
ing to the CDA and saying, "because Congress said so," it is hard to
ferret out a policy rationale that justifies allowing AOL to tout itself as a
service that offers to its readers information from "a gossip columnist or
rumor monger""' without fear of incurring liability (even upon notice),
but allows a book store which sells a newspaper or book containing
identical pieces written by the same author to be found liable if it had
sufficient notice because it offered for sale a work that "notoriously per-
sist[ed] in printing scandalous items.""..4
The Zeran court's holding that distributor liability for ISPs would
create "a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notifica-
tion" that could result in a "chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech,"' 5 fails to take into account that the indiscriminate removal of
internet web sites and bulletin board postings would alienate the ISPs'
subscribers. In addition, many service providers regulate themselves
anyway, because it pays to do so financially. For example, AOL censors
its content itself and provides additional software to parents to censor
content to their own specifications.16 This was indeed a concern of Con-
gress and the courts in the time between the ruling in Stratton Oakmont
and the enactment of the CDA. The Zeran Court could have eliminated
the danger of ISPs being hurt for taking a hands-on approach to editing
content if they had applied the most common-sense interpretation of the
112. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Commu-
nications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALn. L. REv. 147,
177 (1997).
113. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,51 (D.D.C. 1998).
114. R=ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d (1976).
115. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
116. See AOL.com, Parental Controls, (visited April 19, 2000) <http://www.aol.com/
info/parenteontrol.html>.
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CDA-that ISPs are not liable as publishers for third party information
content, but can be as distributors.
It seems only fair that ISPs, when they act as distributors of third
party content, should operate under the same rule as other providers of
information from third parties. If there is a consensus that notice-based
liability is unfair to distributors in a complex modem economy and
digital age then all should receive the benefit of that determination, not
just ISPs. We can, however, reach a common ground. As some com-
mentators have already suggested, common law distributor liability
already provides strong protection to ISPs. It is far from clear that ISPs
need substantial protection against private individuals, who will almost
surely be underfunded in comparison."7 It is hard to justify the current
regime when one considers the fact that a large corporation like AOL is
immunized from liability for distributing defamatory materials while the
neighborhood bookstore is not. ISPs have become one of our greatest
distributors of speech, and it seems both inefficient and unjust to hold
them to a lower standard of liability for defamation than all other exist-
ing distributors.
IV. CAN ISPs FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY IF HELD TO "PUBLISHER
LIABILITY"?: INSTANCES WHEN IT SHOULD APPLY AND THE
PROTECTION OF THE "ACTUAL MALICE" STANDARD
Even if an ISP were held to be a member of the publisher subset be-
cause it acted in an editor's role in regard to a news service like the
"Drudge Report," it would still have significant protection. As a pro-
vider of its own news content the ISP would enjoy the protections of the
same "actual malice" standard available to all citizens when commenting
upon public officials."' In New York Times v. Sullivan"9 the Supreme
Court set aside the common law strict liability regime for defamation
that essentially found that the media published at its own peril.'20 In Sul-
livan, the Court held that a state court regime that allowed "a good-faith
critic of government [to be] penalized for his criticism ... strikes at the
very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression.''
Thus, a public official who is defamed in regard "to his conduct, fitness
or role as public official" cannot bring a defamation action unless he can
prove the defendant knew of "the falsity of the communication or acted
117. See, e.g., Sheridan, supra note 112.
118. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254,283-84 (1964).
119. Id.
120. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 119, at 805.
121. Sullivan. 376 U.S. at 292.
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in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity."' Thus, even if ISPs were
held to be within the publisher subset when they commission and pay for
news articles, in many cases their liability would be notice-based any-
way because many articles would involve public figures and officials
and would therefore trigger the actual malice standard.
It is this actual malice test for defamation of public officials or pub-
lic figures that Drudge plaintiff Sidney Blumenthal would almost surely
have had to have overcome if the Court had not ruled that the existence
of the CDA precluded the question of liability.'2' He would not have had
to prove genuine ill will toward himself by AOL, but would have had to
show by clear and convincing evidence that AOL knew or had reckless
disregard for the fact that the assertions about Blumenthal were libel-
ous.'24 "The standard of actual malice is a daunting one,"' and most
cases using the actual malice standard are resolved in favor of the defen-
dant. One could take the position that the Drudge decision was no great
loss since Blumenthal, because being an advisor to President Clinton and
a well-known writer, he likely would be considered both a public figure
and a public official.
The trial forum, however, is crucial in such cases because the actual
malice standard requires a "subjective" analysis where the court looks to
the specific "state of mind" of each defendant.'26 It will not be enough
for the plaintiff to prove that the publisher failed to investigate the re-
port.'27 The publisher "must act with a 'high degree of awareness of...
probable falsity."'u Only when the publisher is aware that the veracity
of the source is in doubt can it found liable for a reckless disregard of
evidence-if it fails to look at evidence which is within easy reach. 1
9
The evidence at trial will have to be strong enough to support a finding
of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by re-
sponsible publishers."''3
The above standard could certainly be adapted to address the prob-
lems which are unique to Internet journalism. As an ISP publisher would
122. RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. a (1976).
123. Cf Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998)
124. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986).
125. McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
126. See Elizabeth McNamara, Anke Steinecke, Teresa Scott & Gianna McCarthy, A
Selective Survey of Current Issues Facing Book and Magazine Publishers, 516 PLI/PAT 9, 21
(1998).
127. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974) ("[Mlere proof of fail-
ure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth.").
128. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
129. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157-158 (1967).
130. Id. at 158.
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likely be less hands-on than a magazine editor, the time it takes a re-
sponsible Internet publisher to investigate allegations of defamation
might reasonably be longer. As applied to Drudge, what would be cru-
cial is determining what knowledge Drudge had of the "top GOP
operatives"'' who were the sources for his story. Drudge implied later
on that he had essentially been tricked by a partisan source, saying "I've
been had."132 If a court found that Drudge based his report on an unveri-
fied anonymous phone call or had obvious reasons to doubt the source's
veracity, he could still be found liable under the actual malice stan-
dard.' Even if it could have been found that Drudge acted with reckless
disregard for the truth, however, such a finding would not prevent a fact-
finder from absolving AOL even if was held to belong to the "publisher"
subset.
Even putting aside the issue of AOL's separate state of mind, it
would stand a good chance of avoiding liability for arrangements like
the one it had with Matt Drudge on respondeat superior principles.
While it is true that in some circumstances an employee's negligence or
actual malice has been imputed to its publisher 4 if the writer is found to
be an independent contractor then the writer's state of mind cannot be
attributed to the employer.'35 In one federal court decision, the court
found an independent contractor relationship between The New Yorker
and one of its article writers (Janet Malcolm) despite the fact that the she
had a long-term relationship with the magazine and an office at their
headquarters.'36 It found that "if control may be exercised only as to the
result of the work and not the means by which it is accomplished, an
independent contractor relationship is established."'37 This is exactly the
kind of control AOL exercised over Drudge. AOL reserved only the
right to "remove content that AOL reasonably determine[d] to violate
AOL's then standard terms of service."'' Both writers were paid a yearly
salary, but Drudge did not maintain an office at AOL or have a
131. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 46.
132. Robert M. O'Neil, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation,
73 WASH. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (quoting Howard Kurtz, Cyber-Libel and the Web Gossip-
Monger: Matt Drudge's Internet Rumors Spark Suit by White House, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 15, 1997, at GI).
133. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
134. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co, 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
135. See, e.g., McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
136. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
137. Id. at 1373 (quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977
(1970)).
138. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,47 (D.D.C. 1998).
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relationship with it prior to the agreement as Malcolm did.139 In addition,
the New Yorker's editing was much more extensive than AOL's. 40
Thus, one can see that it is not necessary to absolve ISPs of pub-
lisher status to protect them from unjust liability. If the courts found
ISP/news-service writer relationships to be more akin to em-
ployer/independent contractor relationships than an employer/employee
one, ISPs would not have to worry about having the writer's liability
imputed to them regardless of whether their role was more suited to a
publisher or distributor status. One problem AOL would encounter in
making such a claim in regard to Drudge is the fact that it touted him as
a rumormonger and one who could supply "instant gossip" to its sub-
scribers. 4' The plaintiff might claim that AOL has no right to claim it
relied on Drudge's reputation as a reporter if it was instead relying on
him to provide rumors and gossip. These are certainly difficult questions
about the role of an ISP as publisher, but they will never have a chance
to be answered unless the courts are willing to hear claims that ISPs are
responsible as publishers if they act like publishers.
Many commentators welcome the current liability regime for ISPs,
and some have already proposed that any party who participates over the
Internet should be deemed a "public figure" for purposes of determining
liability for defamation committed in Cyberspace.' 42 These arguments
stem from the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 41 in
which the Court designated two bases for determining whether an indi-
vidual is a public or private figure. The first is a general one in which an
individual has achieved "such persvasive fame or notoriety that he [has
become] a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."' '44 The sec-
ond is that of a limited public figure who "voluntarily injects himself or
is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues.' ' 45 Those who advocate that
all Internet participants are public figures look to the policy rationales
for both of these types of public figures in justifying their position. Like
general public figures, Internet participants are said to be worthy of a
139. See Masson, 832 F. Supp. at 1374-75.
140. Id
141. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
142. See, e.g., Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment
Limit for Libel Suits Arising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
235 (1995).
143. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited strict Ii-
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lesser protection against libel because they have access to the same me-
dium to defend themselves against defamatory statements. In addition,
like limited public figures, they have injected themselves voluntarily
into the public controversy through the same medium in which they
claim to be defamed.
46
This position, however, exaggerates the equality of position of the
defamer and the defamed. First, not all Internet authors are equal. The
author of a large public web site like the Drudge Report which registers
millions 47 of visits each month cannot be said to have the same access to
the media as an ordinary Internet user who has a small local web site or
posts to newsgroups or bulletin boards. It would be equivalent to re-
quiring that the host of a public access show in Ann Arbor, MI who
brought suit in Michigan, prove actual malice to prove that Jay Leno was
liable for a defamatory statement because they both had access to the
same medium and locals could just as easily access both shows. No one
would find the private individual's show because no one would be
looking for it-the same as a web site. As far as they are both interject-
ing themselves into the same controversy, it is hard to say this is true if
the public only sees one side of the controversy. This is not a problem
with criticism of public figures because the media usually will broadcast
their opinions and they will reach a stage equal to the defamation. Plus,
the same people interested in the defamation will be more likely to fol-
low the retraction in the case of a public figure. The Supreme Court
addressed these concerns in Gertz:
More important than the likelihood that private Individuals will
lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there is a compelling
normative consideration underlying the distinction between
public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who de-
cides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary
consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the
risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case
.... Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position
.... [They] have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and com-
ment.'
146. See Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L.
REv. 477, 478 (summarizing positions of those who favor this omni-public figure position).
147. See Drudge Report, (visited April 19, 2000) <wvw.drudgereport.com/visits.htm>
(18,087,987 hits from to 3/8100 to 4/7/00).
148. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
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AOL-by adding Drudge's material to its subscriber-only area,
paying him, becoming his sole source of income, and reserving the right
to edit his content-acted similarly to a publisher. It should be not be able
to avoid liability merely because its editorial content travels to users
through a network of computers. A compromise position of only allow-
ing ISPs to have publisher liability when they assume a publisher's role
would both address the complexities of the new medium while at the
same time avoiding the costs of a regime which provides little remedy to
private individuals who are defamed. There are already significant pro-
tections within the law that would protect ISPs from unjustly bearing
responsibility whether they acted as publishers or distributors. Any so-
lution to this situation will be difficult, however, due to the jurisdictional
problems inherent in the Internet and the federal courts' current inter-
pretation of the CDA. In light of these two factors, the only viable
solution that will be fair to both ISPs and future victims of libel is a fed-
eral standard.
V. INTERNET JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS: WHY A FEDERAL
STANDARD IS NECESSARY
The jurisdictional issues related to the Internet are unique, and lend
themselves to the more all-encompassing utility of a federal standard.
No one is really sure how large the Internet really is, and approximately
3/5ths of the 9 million host computers that exist world wide are located
in the United States.' 49 The Internet is largely ungoverned and is slightly
chaotic due to its freeform nature. Whereas the jurisdiction of states is
based on geographical boundaries, cyberspace flows through, across,
and outside of the United States oblivious to those boundaries.'50 As one
court has noted, it is the "unique nature of the Internet [that] highlights
the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoor-
dinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor
never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being ac-
cessed."' 5 ' A state that attempts to legislate the liability of ISPs could run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. It is on this basis that, in Ameri-
can Libraries Association v. Pataki, a U.S. District Court struck down a
New York criminal statute that attempted to make it a felony to inten-
tionally use the Internet to initiate or engage a communication with a
149. See American Libraries Association v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y.
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minor that contains sexual content."2 The Court stated that since the
practical impact of the law would be an "extraterritorial application of
New York law to transactions involving citizens of other states" the law
was "per se violative of the Commerce Clause."'' 3 In advocating a fed-
eral standard for Internet law the Court went on to say that "the unique
nature of cyberspace necessitates uniform national treatment and bars the
states from enacting inconsistent regulatory schemes."
' 54
Of course, ISPs when acting in a capacity as "publishers" of de-
famatory material in America already reap the benefits of a federal
standard. Unfortunately, the standard is no liability. Due to the Internet's
non-jurisdictional nature and its ability to provide anonymity to all par-
ticipants, the current standard leaves little remedy to those individuals
whose reputations have been damaged through the use of Internet com-
munication. Defamation law has traditionally been left to the states, and
the Supreme Court has held that they may "define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of de-
famatory falsehood injurious to a private individual"'5' as long as they do
not impose liability without fault.'56 Though states have a legitimate in-
terest "in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to
reputation,' '5 17 a federal standard imposing some liability is now neces-
sary because we have a federal, largely court-imposed, standard for ISPs
barring virtually all liability.
CONCLUSION
Since authors of defamatory statements are harder to identify on the
Internet and the scope of the medium is worldwide, it is unfair to hold
carriers who unwittingly disseminate such messages over the Internet to
a lower standard of responsibility than all other distributors. Congress
needs to create a new federal standard to correct the ambiguities present
in the "good samaritan" provisions of the Communications Decency Act,
as the Courts have misinterpreted the provision to give immunity from
defamation suits to ISPs for information content that they do not create
themselves. Such reform seems particularly apropos considering that the
major provisions of the Act were overturned by the Supreme Court in
Reno v. ACLU. Since the courts' current interpretation of the "good
152. Id. at 182-83.
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samaritan" provisions of the CDA provides less protection than is
needed for libel victims and more protection than is needed for ISPs,
Congress should amend those provisions to allow an ISP to be held to
the same liability standard as the media it most closely resembles given
the nature of the ISP and the role it plays as content provider in the par-
ticular case at issue.
If Congress were to clearly define the meaning of the word
"publisher" in the CDA to make it clear that distributor liability for third
party content is possible, that would certainly be an improvement. But
that interpretation would also fail to take into account the growing ways
in which ISPs act like members of the "publisher" subset. Amongst
modem communications mediums, ISPs are unique in the ways they can
act as both publishers and distributors of written content. In our efforts
to protect them from unjust liability for the former, we should not pre-
clude liability for the latter if it is deserved. In order to prevent a federal
standard for liability from having a "chilling effect" on free speech,
Congress should also provide a standard for the notification process
similar to that used in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. Such a
process is necessary because it is impossible to both allow completely
unfettered free speech on the Internet and still protect the interest an in-
dividual has in her good name and reputation. If Congress were to
reform the CDA and pass legislation stating that ISPs should be consid-
ered in most instances a distributor but in certain rare cases a publisher,
it would create a liability standard that would do the least harm to the
forum for free speech over the Internet. Such a standard would stand the
best chance of preserving the right of individuals to freely speak their
mind and communicate with each other in Cyberspace, while reviving
the tort the common law developed to protect the interest each person
has in preserving his good name that makes others willing to listen.
